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Abstract 
This study investigated why employees self-disclose on Facebook, and whether there is a difference in 
self-disclosure between employees of an Australian government organisation and an academic 
institution. We employed quantitative and qualitative approaches, including an online questionnaire 
of 216 participants and ten interviews. The two organisations were compared on organisational 
variables, and measures of Privacy Concerns, Privacy Behaviour and Propensity to Trust as potential 
predictors of self-disclosure. Privacy Behaviour and Propensity to Trust were significant predictors for 
the government organisation, whereas demographic and organisational factors were the main 
predictors for the academic institution. Furthermore, qualitative findings revealed that, whilst the 
government participants focussed on the costs of self-disclosure on Facebook, the academic institution 
participants focussed on the benefits of self-disclosure. These results provide preliminary support for 
our online self-disclosure model, and highlight the importance of considering different organisations 
and populations in studies of online self-disclosure and privacy.  
Keywords self-disclosure, privacy behaviour, privacy paradox, social media, Facebook 
  
Australasian Conference on Information Systems  Parsons et al. 
2016, Wollongong  Self-Disclosure on Facebook 
  2 
1 Introduction 
Social Media (SM) has attracted large numbers of users worldwide, and has become a significant part 
of daily routine and social interaction (Fogel & Nehmad, 2009; Wilson, Gosling, & Graham, 2012). 
Facebook is currently among the most popular SM websites, with over one billion active users 
(Statistics Brain, 2015). However, with the increase of SM popularity, potential online privacy and 
security issues have come to the fore (Debatin, Lovejoy, Horn, & Hughes, 2009; Dey, Jelveh, & Ross, 
2012). Organisational Reviews of SM have flagged many potential concerns, and recommend cautious 
use (Arico & Srinivasan, 2014; George Patterson Y&R, 2011; Parsons, McCormac, & Butavicius, 2011). 
With large amounts of personal information available on SM, users could unintentionally expose 
themselves, their work colleagues and their organisations to serious risks. These risks may include 
becoming a victim of phishing, stalking or extortion (Molok, Chang, & Ahmad, 2010). Phishing is a 
social engineering technique used to trick users into providing private information (Parmar, 2012; 
Parsons et al., 2015).  
It is important to understand how people engage with SM and whether their workplace practices affect 
how they use SM. Employees of organisations where sensitive information is frequently handled, such 
as in the defence, security, financial or technology sectors, may be more exposed to cyber threats than 
other industries (Arico & Srinivasan, 2014). Simply put, we hypothesise that individuals who handle 
more sensitive information will be more cautious about the information, both personal as well as 
organisational, that they disclose on Facebook. Hence, this paper examines self-disclosure on 
Facebook, within two Australian organisations. A government organisation, where employees 
frequently handle sensitive information, will be compared to an academic institution, where sensitive 
information is handled less frequently. For the purposes of this paper, sensitive information refers to 
information such as: intellectual property, financial and classified information and data that could 
cause damage to an individual, organisation or national interests if it were disclosed to the public.  
1.1 Cybersecurity in the Workplace  
Cybersecurity involves the measures taken to protect a computer or computer system (Bullock, 
Haddow, & Coppola, 2013). The threat of cybercrime is ever growing, affecting individuals as well as 
industry, both private and public, with some estimates proposing a global cost of $1 trillion every year 
(Lewis & Baker, 2013). The disclosure of personal and organisational information on SM can have a 
detrimental effect on cybersecurity.  
The unintentional disclosure of an organisation’s sensitive information through the irresponsible use 
of SM can lead to potential loss of productivity and can result in significant consequences to an 
organisation’s reputation and future revenue (Molok et al., 2010). A recent report by the Guardian 
revealed that a number of government departments have unintentionally released confidential 
information (Ramesh, 2015). For example, Northamptonshire county council accidentally published 
data on more than 1,400 children, including names, addresses, religion and special educational needs 
status (Ramesh, 2015). In another case, the Israeli military cancelled an entire operation after one of 
its military personnel disclosed the location and time of an upcoming raid in their Facebook status 
update (BBC News, 2010).  
Disclosing personal information on SM can also have serious consequences. For example, this 
information can be used to facilitate spear-phishing. Spear-phishing is a specific type of phishing; 
whereas standard phishing emails are generic, and sent to many users, spear-phishing emails are 
highly personalised, and are aimed at, and sent to, specific individuals. Consequently, spear-phishing 
has been found to be more effective at eliciting information from users (Butavicius, Parsons, Pattinson, 
& McCormac, 2015; Parmar, 2012). Organisations where employees handle sensitive information, such 
as in the defence, security, financial or technology sectors, may be more at risk compared to other 
industries (Arico & Srinivasan, 2014). Accordingly, government departments faced the highest number 
of spear-phishing attacks (Symantec Corporation, 2014). While stringent security procedures may help 
to mitigate cyber risks within organisations, little is known about how employees of these 
organisations behave online.  
1.2 Why do People Self-Disclose? 
Self-disclosure involves the information that individuals willingly and deliberately reveal about 
themselves, such as their personal details, photos and experiences (Pearce & Sharp, 1973). For most 
SM websites, the information disclosed can be made private or public. However, even if a user has a 
private profile, the general public can usually view some of their details. This has led many to question 
the privacy and security of SM (e.g., Acquisti & Gross, 2006; Fogel & Nehmad, 2009; Shin, 2010).  
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Even though most people understand the issues and risks associated with SM, they often continue to 
disclose personal information (Shin, 2010). This discrepancy between people’s privacy concerns and 
their online behaviour has been described as the privacy paradox (Barnes, 2006; Taddicken, 2014). To 
date, empirical findings on the privacy paradox have been inconsistent (e.g., Dienlin & Trepte, 2015; 
Utz, 2009). These inconsistent findings may be at least partially due to different definitions and 
conceptualisations of privacy concerns and behaviours, and research failing to consider the 
multidimensional nature of privacy. For example, behaviour could be assessed in regards to the things 
that people do to protect their privacy (e.g., clearing one’s browser history), or the actual information 
that people disclose online (e.g., disclosing their phone number on Facebook). Previous studies have 
primarily considered only one of these aspects of behaviour (e.g., Acquisti & Gross, 2006; Ellison, 
Vitak, Steinfield, Gray, & Lampe, 2011). In this study, we consider both of these forms of online 
behaviour, the actual information that people self-disclose online as well as the things that people can 
do to protect this information, to measure self-disclosure within the Facebook specific context.  
Adapted from Posey et al. (2010), the exploratory model of online self-disclosure presented in Figure 1 
proposes that, when deciding whether to self-disclose, people weigh up the costs and benefits, and this 
is affected by both social and individual factors. In line with Posey et al. (2010), our model draws on a 
number of theories, including Social Exchange Theory, Social Penetration Theory, and 
Communication Privacy Management Theory (Altman & Taylor, 1973; Jarvenpaa & Staples, 2001; 
Petronio, 2002). However, our approach is exploratory, rather than one of theory verification. This is 
in line with the recommendation of Karjalainen (2011) who argues that focusing on a single theory 
may neglect potentially important variables.  
 
 
Figure 1: Online self-disclosure model (adapted from Posey et al. (2010)) 
The individual factors include demographics and personality variables, such as propensity to trust. 
There is evidence that different genders use different rules when determining whether to disclose 
(Petronio, 2002). For example, Walrave, Vanwesenbeeck, and Heirman (2012) found that female 
adolescents were more protective of their online privacy, and Chang and Heo (2014) found that males 
perceived less risk, and were therefore more likely to self-disclose. Previous research has revealed that 
trust can predict purchasing and disclosure behaviour (Joinson, Reips, Buchanan, & Schofield, 2010; 
Metzger, 2006). Trust has also been found to mediate SM behaviours, in terms of how trusting an 
individual is and the extent to which a particular SM site is perceived as trustworthy (Malhotra, Kim, & 
Agarwal, 2004; Taddei & Contena, 2013). The frequency and nature of self-disclosure is also 
influenced by social factors, such as the desire for acceptance (Posey et al., 2010). Essentially, 
individuals who desire to be more similar to those in their environment are more influenced by the 
behaviour of others. Cialdini (2009) has referred to this as the principle of social proof. For example, if 
members of one’s social network frequently share photos on their Facebook page, people who are 
influenced by this principle will be more likely to do the same.  
Potential costs of self-disclosure could include exposure to risks that may jeopardise personal safety, or 
the safety of others (Petronio, 2002). For example, personal information disclosed on SM could be 
used for malicious purposes. Benefits associated with self-disclosure could include improved well-
being, relationship maintenance, emotional support, and exposure to new information (Ellison, 
Steinfield, & Lampe, 2007; Taddei & Contena, 2013). Also, reciprocity is often described as an 
Social factors
Self-disclosure
Perceived benefits
Perceived costs
Individual factors
Australasian Conference on Information Systems  Parsons et al. 
2016, Wollongong  Self-Disclosure on Facebook 
  4 
important benefit of self-disclosure, and simply put, is based on the idea that people are more likely to 
self-disclose if they have been a recipient of such disclosure (Posey et al., 2010).  
1.3 Present Study 
The primary aim of the present study was to investigate whether there is a difference in self-disclosure 
on Facebook between employees of a government organisation and an academic institution. A range of 
organisational variables, privacy related behaviours and attitudes were measured to address the 
following research question: Why do employees self-disclose on Facebook? 
2 Method 
Using a between-groups design, we employed a dual methodology, incorporating qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. A total of 216 participants, all Facebook users, completed an online 
questionnaire. This consisted of 138 participants from the government organisation, and 78 
participants from the Academic institution. The age distribution and education level were very similar 
between the two organisations. However, the gender distribution varied with a predominantly male 
sample (65%) for the government organisation, and predominantly female sample (71%) for the 
academic institution. The samples were also similar in their primary function, namely, research, and 
both organisations have SM policies, and provide training on information and cyber security.  
2.1 Measures 
The questionnaire was administered during June and July 2014, and took approximately 20 minutes 
to complete. To evaluate the influence of organisational differences, participants were asked about 
their organisation’s SM policy and their access to sensitive information. Participants were provided 
with the following practical definition of sensitive information:  
“Sensitive information refers to information such as: intellectual property, financial and 
classified information and data that could cause damage to an individual, organisation or 
national interests if it were disclosed to the public”.  
The online questionnaire also included demographic questions, and incorporated the following 
measures:  
The Privacy Concerns Scale (Buchanan, Paine, Joinson, & Reips, 2007) measures an individual’s 
concerns in relation to their online privacy. The measure contains 16 items; participants respond to 
each item on a five-point Likert scale. Higher scores indicate more privacy concerns for Internet 
related security topics. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient, which is a measure of the reliability of the 
scale, was .95 in this study. 
The Privacy Behaviour Scale (Buchanan et al., 2007) focusses on the things that people do to 
protect their privacy. This measure contains six General Caution questions, which assess 
individuals’ general protection behaviours. It also contains six Technical Protection questions, 
which reflect the use of technology to protect privacy. Items are measured on a five-point Likert scale 
and higher scores indicate more security conscious privacy behaviour. The Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient for General Caution was .82, and .79 for Technical Protection. 
The Propensity to Trust Scale (Cheung & Lee, 2006) contains two items, and measures an 
individual’s tendency to trust on a five-point Likert scale. Higher scores indicate a higher tendency to 
trust. The Cronbach’s alpha in this study was .81. 
The Risky Facebook Behaviours Scale (Appendix A) measures the extent to which individuals 
engage in risky behaviours on Facebook, which we conceptualise as Facebook self-disclosure. This 
scale was developed for this study, and contains 12 items. It focusses on actual behaviours that users 
may engage in, rather than their opinions or attitudes. The scale incorporates items on the specific 
information that people may disclose on Facebook. These items were chosen to represent the 
information requested when creating a Facebook profile. The scale also incorporates items on the 
things that people can do to protect their privacy on Facebook, such as limiting access to their profile 
by making it private. A higher score indicates more risky Facebook behaviour. To assess its validity, 
the items were piloted with experienced Facebook users and wording was modified to avoid confusion. 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient in this study was .55. Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, and Tatham 
(2006) argued that alpha coefficients close to .60 are acceptable for exploratory research. This level of 
internal consistency can be expected given the diversity of the psychological construct being measured 
(Field, 2009). Essentially, the patterns of behaviour associated with how people self-disclose online 
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may be expected to vary. For example, the scale includes items about specific information that the 
respondent might share on Facebook, and although it is commonly accepted to disclose your name, it 
is far less common to share your phone number or personal address. 
2.2 Qualitative Component  
As part of the online questionnaire, participants were asked the following open-ended question, 
“What, if anything, do you consider before posting to social media?” Also, on completion of the online 
questionnaire, participants were invited to take part in a follow-up interview. Brief 15 minute 
interviews were conducted with five government organisation participants and five academic 
institution participants. Interview questions focused on reasons for self-disclosure, and an example 
question included, “What do you think influences your online behaviour and the information you 
disclose on the Internet?” Each interview was conducted with one interviewee and two investigators.  
3 Results 
The primary aim of this study was to investigate whether there is a difference in self-disclosure on 
Facebook between employees of a government organisation and an academic institution. First, we 
compared the two samples on organisational differences that may have affected self-disclosure. A chi-
square test was conducted to compare the groups on whether they knew that their organisation had a 
SM policy. The government participants were significantly more likely to know that their organisation 
had a SM policy, X2 (2, N = 216) = 84.92, p < .001. Furthermore, an independent samples t-test 
showed that the government participants (M = 3.68, SD = 1.16) reported handling sensitive 
information more frequently compared to the academic institution participants (M = 3.00, SD = 1.29), 
t (214) = 3.98; p < .001, d = .56.  
We then compared the two samples on a number of potential predictors of self-disclosure on 
Facebook, namely, Privacy Concerns, General Caution, Technical Protection and Propensity to Trust. 
We also compared the two samples on the Risky Facebook Behaviours Scale. As shown in Table 1, the 
samples differed significantly in regards to Technical Protection, Propensity to Trust and Risky 
Facebook Behaviours. These results suggest that the government participants were more likely to use 
technical controls to protect their privacy, and less likely to self-disclose on Facebook. Although the 
academic institution participants scored higher on the Propensity to Trust measure than the 
government participants, the magnitude of the difference was small. 
 
 Government 
organisation 
M (SD) 
Academic 
institution 
M (SD) 
t p d 
Privacy Concerns 41.72 (11.82) 45.50 (16.67) -1.94 .054 -.28 
General Caution 18.59 (4.53) 17.49 (5.77)  1.56 .120  .22 
Technical Protection 21.97 (4.27) 20.00 (5.88)  2.83 .005*  .40 
Propensity to Trust 5.33 (1.61) 5.83 (1.96) -2.06 .041* -.29 
Risky Facebook Behaviours 3.65 (1.42) 5.26 (1.94) -6.97 .001** -.99 
Table 1.  Independent samples t-tests for the government organisation (n = 138) and the academic 
institution (n = 78) 
Given these differences between the two samples, two four-stage hierarchical multiple regressions 
were conducted (i.e., one for each organisation) to determine which of the measured variables may 
predict participants’ self-disclosure on Facebook (see Table 2). Gender and age were entered at stage 
one of the regression to control for these variables. The organisational variables (i.e., how frequently 
participants access sensitive information and knowledge of their organisation’s SM policy) were 
entered at stage two. The Privacy Behaviour variables (i.e., General Caution and Technical Protection) 
were entered at stage three, and Propensity to Trust and Privacy Concerns at stage four.  
For the government participants, none of the potential predictor variables in stage one and stage two 
were significant, accounting for only 3% of the variance in self-disclosure on Facebook. In stage three, 
however, introducing the Privacy Behaviour variables explained an additional 17% of the variance. In 
stage four, Propensity to Trust and Privacy Concerns explained an additional 7% of the variance. 
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Privacy Concerns was not a significant predictor, but Propensity to Trust was the most important 
predictor overall. Together, the eight independent variables accounted for 27% of the variance in self-
disclosure on Facebook for the government participants.  
A very different pattern of results was found using the same hierarchical multiple regression model for 
the academic institution. Unlike the government organisation, the main predictors for the academic 
institution were demographic and organisational variables. Both gender and age were significant at 
stage one, accounting for 10% of the variance. At stage two, the organisational variables accounted for 
an additional 7% of the variance. The variables introduced in stages three and four explained only an 
additional 2%, but overall, the model explained 19% of the variance. Gender and knowledge of SM 
policy were the most important predictors of the variance in self-disclosure on Facebook for academic 
institution participants. 
 
 Government Organisation Academic Institution 
Variable β t β t 
Step 1 F(2, 135) = 2.02, R2 = .03^ F(2, 75) = 4.14, R2 = .10* 
Gender (Female = 2) 
Age 
-.06 
-.16 
  -.73 
-1.90 
-.28 
-.25 
-2.44* 
-2.18* 
Step 2 ΔF(4, 133) = 1.10, R2 = .03^ ΔF(4, 73) = 3.74, R2 = .17* 
Gender 
Age 
Frequency sensitive information 
Knowledge of SM policy+ 
-.08 
-.15 
-.03 
 .04 
  -.86 
-1.78 
  -.38 
   .48 
-.26 
-.21 
-.14 
 .23 
-2.32* 
-1.89 
-1.30 
2.12* 
Step 3 ΔF(6, 131) = 5.46, R2 = .20** ΔF(6, 71) = 2.61, R2 = .18* 
Gender 
Age 
Frequency sensitive information 
Knowledge of SM policy  
General Caution 
Technical Protection 
-.07 
-.07 
 .04 
-.01 
-.25 
-.27 
  -.84 
  -.79 
   .49 
  -.06 
-2.75* 
-3.14* 
-.27 
-.14 
-.14  
 .23 
-.13 
 .03 
-2.33* 
-1.66 
-1.28 
 2.09* 
  -.89 
   .24 
Step 4  ΔF(8, 129) = 5.80, R2 = .27** ΔF(8, 69) = 2.02, R2 = .19^ 
Gender 
Age 
Frequency sensitive information 
Knowledge of SM policy 
General Caution 
Technical Protection 
Propensity to Trust 
Privacy Concerns 
-.08 
-.08 
 .03 
 .00 
-.21 
-.22 
 .25 
-.07 
-1.01 
-1.02 
   .33 
   .04  
-2.26* 
-2.59* 
 3.22* 
  -.73 
-.27 
-.19 
-.14 
 .22 
-.17 
 .02 
 .01 
 .11 
-2.32* 
-1.56 
-1.28 
 2.03* 
-1.11 
   .13 
   .12 
   .85 
* p < .05, ** p < .001, ^p> .05, + No = 2 
Table 2.  Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for the government organisation and 
academic institution for variables predicting self-disclosure on Facebook 
3.1 Qualitative Component 
To further investigate why employees self-disclose on Facebook, we analysed the open-ended 
responses from the questionnaire and the brief interviews, into thematic categories to describe 
meaningful patterns and themes in the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Participants from both groups 
frequently discussed how their self-disclosure on Facebook was perceived by those around them. 
While government participants focussed on the negatives, the academic institution participants were 
more likely to consider the positive implications.  
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The negatives that government participants discussed centred primarily on security and professional 
implications. They often considered the policies of their organisation, as well as concerns for personal 
security. Hence, their focus was on the perceived costs and privacy risk of self-disclosure on Facebook.  
“The policy of social media from work … that’s always at the back of my mind.”  
“Working here, definitely. You know what you should and should not be disclosing.”  
“Due to privacy and security concerns (both work and personal), I do not post on social 
media. I only very occasionally access it to view posts from friends and family.” 
“What my security officers might think of my posts. Whether, as a public servant, I'm 
allowed to express an opinion on the matter.” 
In contrast, the academic institution participants focussed on potential positives and the importance of 
their social image. Respondents typically discussed self-disclosure in terms of value, to themselves and 
their audience. Overall, the academic institution participants focussed on the perceived benefits 
associated with self-disclosure on Facebook.  
“What benefit will I get out of writing what I am writing, if nothing - why am I bothering?” 
“Whether audience would find it interesting or useful.” 
“Whether the articles I post will be interesting to others (I predominantly post science 
articles), or engage/begin a dialogue with others.” 
“I always consider the impact [that] this will have on my profile - I am very careful about 
cultivating a deliberate online profile.” 
4 Discussion 
In this study, we examined some potential variables that could predict why employees of a government 
organisation and an academic institution self-disclose on Facebook. This research was motivated by 
reports that government departments, where employees handle more sensitive information, may be 
more exposed to cyber threats and were found to be most attacked by spear-phishing compared to 
other industries (Arico & Srinivasan, 2014; Symantec Corporation, 2014). Hence, sharing both 
personal and organisational information on Facebook could expose their organisation to cyber threats. 
In this study, we were particularly interested in the extent to which individuals who work for a 
government organisation self-disclose on Facebook, and compared them to an academic institution. 
The study included an online questionnaire completed by 216 participants and follow-up interviews. 
The potential variables that could predict Facebook self-disclosure differed between the two 
organisations. 
The government organisation and academic institution were compared on several potential predictors 
of self-disclosure on Facebook. This included organisational variables (i.e., how frequently participants 
access sensitive information and knowledge of their organisation’s SM policy), as well as measures of 
Privacy Concerns, General Caution, Technical Protection and Propensity to Trust. Government 
participants were more likely to know that their organisation had a SM policy and they handled 
sensitive information more frequently compared to the academic institution participants. They were 
also more likely to implement technical safeguards, and had a lower propensity to trust. The 
government participants were also less likely to self-disclose on Facebook. These differences between 
the organisations provided justification for considering the two samples separately in determining why 
employees self-disclose on Facebook.  
4.1 Why Employees Self-Disclose on Facebook? 
The qualitative findings clearly show differences in self-disclosure between the two organisations, and 
these differences can be explained by the online self-disclosure model adapted from Posey et al. 
(2010). This model proposes that when deciding whether to self-disclose, people weigh up the costs 
and benefits, and consider the actions of those around them (Altman & Taylor, 1973; Petronio, 2002; 
Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). Qualitative responses provided evidence that both groups of participants 
considered their social network when self-disclosing. However, the trade-off between the costs and 
benefits was interpreted in a very different manner. The government participants focussed 
predominately on perceived costs and privacy risks, which suggests that they may have considered the 
consequences of potential cyber-attacks. In contrast, the academic institution participants were more 
likely to consider the perceived benefits of self-disclosure. They highlighted the importance of 
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obtaining value, for themselves and their audience, which other researchers have described as the 
benefits of social capital online (Ellison, Gray, Lampe, & Fiore, 2014; Ellison et al., 2007).   
Using multiple hierarchical regressions of some potential predictors of self-disclosure on Facebook for 
the two samples, a very different pattern of results emerged. The measured variables explained 27% of 
the variance in self-disclosure for the government and 19% for the academic institution participants. 
This suggests that there are other variables at play. For example, the qualitative findings showed that 
those from the academic institution focussed primarily on the benefits of self-disclosure, which were 
not measured quantitatively in our study. These should be examined in future research. 
For government participants, self-disclosure was most strongly predicted by propensity to trust. This is 
consistent with Joinson et al. (2010), who claim that trust is a key factor when deciding to share 
personal information with others. However, as trust was not a predictor for the academic participants, 
our findings indicate that this relationship may differ depending on the population of interest. Privacy 
behaviours, conceptualised as the things that people do to protect their privacy online, were also 
predicted self-disclosure for government participants, but not for those from the academic institution. 
Therefore, government participants who took steps to protect their personal information (i.e., General 
Caution) and implemented technical safeguards (i.e., Technical Protection) were less likely to disclose 
on Facebook. This might be because, as evidenced by our qualitative findings, the government 
organisation participants were more focussed on perceived costs and privacy risks.  
For academic institution participants, self-disclosure was most strongly predicted by gender, with 
female participants less likely to disclose on Facebook. This is consistent with Chang and Heo (2014) 
who reported that males from an academic institution were more likely to self-disclose on Facebook 
due to less perceived risk. Similarly, Walrave et al. (2012) found that female adolescents were more 
protective of their online privacy and disclosed less. The only other significant predictor for the 
academic institution participants was whether they knew that their organisation had a SM policy.  
Interestingly, privacy concerns were not found to predict self-disclosure for either organisation. This is 
consistent with the premise of the privacy paradox, which posits that although most people understand 
the issues and risks associated with SM, they often continue to disclose personal information (Shin, 
2010). To date, the privacy paradox has had inconsistent support. In line with Dienlin and Trepte 
(2015), we argue this may be due to the failure to consider the multidimensional nature of privacy. For 
example, behaviour could be assessed in regards to the things that people do to protect their privacy, 
or the actual information that people disclose online, and in this study, we measure both within the 
Facebook specific context. This highlights the need for further research that considers the 
multidimensional nature of privacy behaviour.   
4.2 Limitations and Future Research  
Although, our regression models explained between 19 and 27% of the variance in self-disclosure on 
Facebook, this leaves room for further investigation of other potential predictors. For example, 
researchers measure potential benefits of self-disclosure, such as social capital. Additional individual 
differences could also be studied. For example, Utz (2009) found that individuals who scored more 
highly on impression management and narcissism employed less restrictive privacy settings. Also, this 
research does not consider many other organisational factors, such as organisational culture, training, 
and rewards and punishments. Organisational culture is considered a major factor in developing a 
better security culture to guide employee behaviour (Lim, Chang, Maynard, & Ahmad, 2009). Further 
research could examine information security training programs, which may influence the accepted 
security culture and knowledge of possible cyber threats. Research could also focus on multiple 
organisations, particularly those more at risk of cyber-attacks, such as government organisations.  
A common limitation of questionnaire based studies is the reliance on self-report, resulting in 
potential biased responses. Future research could analyse individuals’ SM accounts in combination 
with self-report measures. This may give a more objective assessment of online behaviour. 
Furthermore, the Risky Facebook Behaviours scale requires further validity testing. However, as the 
scale focusses on actual behaviours rather than more subjective attitudes or options, the pilot testing 
conducted was sufficient for the purposes of this study.  
It is also important to replicate the findings in this study with more homogeneous samples. In our 
study, the majority of the participants from the government organisation were males, whereas the 
majority of the participants from the academic institution were females. Gender was found to be a 
predictor of self-disclosure on Facebook for the academic institution participants, however, not for the 
government organisation. It is possible that this may be a reflection of the gender distribution in the 
samples.  
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5 Conclusion 
As the popularity of SM has rapidly grown and continues to evolve, privacy and security issues have 
become a major focus. With an increasing number of security threats to organisations, attention has 
shifted towards the impact of employees’ online behaviour, both personal and work-related, on their 
organisations. Given the lack of research about organisations that may be more at risk of cybercrime, 
such as government organisations where employees more frequently handle sensitive information, this 
study sought to address this gap. We compared the variables that could predict self-disclosure on 
Facebook for an Australian government organisation and Australian academic institution, and the 
populations were influenced by very different variables. Whilst the government participants focussed 
on the perceived costs, the participants from the academic institution focussed predominately on the 
benefits associated with self-disclosure on Facebook. The results of this study provide preliminary 
support for our online self-disclosure model, and highlight the importance of considering different 
organisations and populations when analysing online behaviour. It is only through further analysis of a 
wide-range of populations that we will fully understand online self-disclosure and privacy.   
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Appendix 1: Risky Facebook Behaviours Scale 
 Is your profile public (as opposed to private)? * 
 Have you ever accepted a friend request from someone you didn’t know? * 
 How frequently do you change your Facebook password? ^ 
 How frequently do you review your security settings on Facebook? ^ 
 Do you provide the following information on Facebook? # 
o Place of work  
o Date of birth 
o Role/position at your organisation  
o Phone number 
o Address 
o Location  
o Personal email 
o Real name  
* Yes; No; Not applicable   
^ Never; Less than once a year; Annually; Semi-annually; More than once a month 
# Yes, I provide this information; I partially provide this information; No, I do not provide this information 
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